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CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION

CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION
AND THE RULE(S) OF COURTS
LORNE SOSSIN*
Constitutional authority for the development and
implementation of the rules of court lies with both the
legislature, by its statutorypower, and the judiciary,
by the constitutional principles of judicial
independence. The court rules in question here are
those that govern court accessibility as well as the
roles and responsibilitiesofparties in civil litigation.
The three existing models of rule-making are courtled, where a majority of government officials, and
collaborative, which lacks an evident majority of
either. These rule-making bodies do not controlcourt
fees, the executive does, but in a system with any
model, the judiciary always has the final say in
interpretingandimplementing the rules orfees of the
court. This creates an unavoidable conflict between
the government and the judiciary.
The relevant principles ofjudicial independence in
this conflict are the inherent powers of the courts to
control all aspects ofjudicialfunction,as well as the
necessity of accessibilityto the courts. The integrity of
the administrationofjustice requiresa constitutional
compromise that respects theseprinciplesand creates
an interdependentbalance between thejudiciaryand
Parliament.An independent commission composed of
non-judicial, non-governmental mediators where
disputes between the courts and the governments may
be brought would support this requirement. Such a
commission would instill the necessary confidence in
both parties, and would facilitate an effective
collaborativeguardianshipover the administrationof
court rules and fees while preserving the
constitutionalprinciples.

L 'autoritdconstitutionnellepour le developpement et
la mise en oeuvre des r'gles de procddure repose
auprbs de la legislature,de par son pouvoir ldgal, et
auprbs de I'ordre judiciaire, de par les principes
constitutionnelsd 'indipendancejudiciaire.
Les rigles
de la cour remises en question sont celles qui
rigissentI 'accessibilitit la courainsi que les rdles et
les responsabilitsdes partiesd'un procis civil. Les
troismodles d'tablissementde r~glesexistants sont
mengs par le tribunal, ohi une majoriti de
reprsentantsdu gouvernement, et collaboratifqui
n 'a pas de vraie majoritg. Ces organismes voient i
l 'itablissementde rbgles, mais ne contr6lentpas nos
droits de greffe car, c est I 'autorit exicutive qui y
voit. Maisdons un systlme dote d'un modle, l ordre
judiciaire a le dernier mot en ce qui a trait 6i
I 'interprdtationet i la mise en oeuvre des r&gles et
des frais judiciaires. Cela crie inivitablement un
conflit entre le gouvernement et l'ordrejudiciaire.
Dans ce conflit, les principes d'indpendance
judiciairepertinents sont les pouvoirs inhrents des
tribunauxde contrdler tous les aspects de lafonction
judiciaire, ainsi que le besoin d'accessibilitM aux
tribunaux.L 'int~gritdde 'administrationde lajustice
exige un compromis constitutionnel qui respecte ces
principes et crie un dquilibre interdipendantentre
I'ordrejudiciaireet le Parlement. Une commission
indipendante constitute de midiateurs non
judiciaireset non gouvernementaux, oii des disputes
entre les tribunaux et les gouvernements peuvent tre
prgsentes rdpondraitaice besoin. En outre, une telle
commission accorderaitla confiance voulue aux deux
parties et faciliterait une tutelle en participation
applicable sur 1'administration des dcisions
judiciaireset les droits de greffe, tout en respectant
les principes constitutionnels.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In this article, I ask what ought to be a simple question: who has constitutional authority
for the development and implementation of the rules of court, and what are the limits, if any,
on that authority. There are two simple answers, neither of which is on its own satisfactory,
and each of which is difficult to reconcile with the other. The first answer is that it falls to the
constitutional principles of the supremacy of Parliament and ministerial responsibility in a
Westminster system to govern courts and their jurisdiction and processes. In other words,
legislators have the final say in enacting statutes that demarcate the scope and powers of
various courts, including the rules by which those courts are governed. The Attorney General,
in turn, has supervision over the running of the courts and is responsible to the legislature for
how the court budget is spent. The second answer is that the constitutional principles of
judicial independence and access to justice require the courts to have ultimate supervisory
authority over their own jurisdiction and processes. In other words, even if rules may come
in the form of legislation or regulation, and even if court staff nominally report to the
Attorney General, courts have functional control over the rules by which they are governed.
Thus, the simple answer is that both the legislature and thejudiciary have final authority over
the rules of court. This kind of simple answer, of course, simply begs more complex
questions.
If both Parliament and the courts arguably have final authority over changes to court rules
(which I take to include, as discussed below, court fees), then how are disputes, if they arise,
to be resolved, and the boundaries between political, administrative and judicial decisionmaking to be clarified? I suggest that it is in such settings that the only way forward, in both
a principled and pragmatic sense, is constitutional accommodation and institutional
interdependence. Constitutional accommodation will turn on a variety of factors and does not
lead to one-size-fits-all solutions. Rather, it suggests a spectrum of possibilities for dealing.
with the relationship between government and courts across a range of functions and issues.
That a mechanism ofcollaboration is appropriate for determining changes to the rules of civil
procedure does not suggest this same mechanism is best suited to collaborating in the setting
of court fees. It is to the need for and the nature of this spectrum of constitutional
accommodation that I wish to devote the following brief analysis.
I believe this topic has never been of more urgent concern. Governments are under
unprecedented pressure to ensure access to the courts, modernize court administration and
find savings in the justice system. Courts are under unprecedented pressure to do more with
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less and to preserve the best interests of the justice system while remaining out ofthe political
fray. The spectacle of showdowns between Chief Justices and Attorneys General over
courthouse closures, budgets, building safety, labour relations, security and information
technology, library facilities and even parking, has led to a proliferation of litigation and
threats of litigation, adversarial posturing and an erosion of trust and confidence in the
systems of court governance now in place in Canada.' There is a pressing need for a
collaborative and effective means of bridging the constitutional divide between the
governmental and thejudicial responsibilities over maintaining and running courts. The time
is thus ripe for a reappraisal of the place of court administration in Canada.
This analysis is divided into three sections. In the first section, Ibriefly explore the scope
and content of rules of court, a term without a clear definition, and the current institutional
forms through which those rules are developed. In the second section, I examine the
constitutional principles and doctrines that apply to the rules of court and demonstrate the
tensions and interdependence between courts, executive and legislative institutions in relation
to courts. Finally, in the third section, I argue for a framework of constitutional
accommodation to resolve the puzzle of who has the last word in terms of rules of court.

I.

RULES OF COURT

The rules of court regulate the practice and procedure of litigation and perform a
gatekeeping function in terms of access tojustice. I am here concerned specifically with civil
courts, although many of the same issues and principles arise in the criminal justice system
as well (and often with graver consequences at stake in the proceedings).2 Court rules may
come in different forms; they may be legislative (set out in statutes such as the Courts of
JusticeAct), in regulations (such as the Rules of Civil Procedure,or Court Tariffs, etc.) or
administrative (Practice Directions, Notices to the Profession, administrative guidelines,
etc.); they may be issued by the Court or by the executive; they may emanate from rules
committees, the office of a Chief Justice or the Ministry of the Attorney General; they may
apply to various courts or just one, to all parties or just some.
What I term the court rules cover, in short, access to courts and the roles and
responsibilities of parties once in the civil litigation system (including court-annexed or
mandatory mediation, case management, court fees and other facets of court administration
with a direct impact on civil litigation). While this definition is broader than most
traditionally given to the rules of court (which would leave out, for example, court fees), it
is not intended to capture every aspect of court administration. I wish to distinguish the rules
of court from the more general questions regarding court administration, such as who

2

See Cristin Schmitz "Superior court judges seeking substantial pay raise; control over court
administration" The Lawyers Weekly (29 August 2003) I.
In the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, courts are given express delegated authority to issue rules.
Section 482(1) of the Criminal Code provides,
Every superior court of criminal jurisdiction and every court of appeal may make rules of court not
inconsistent with this or any other Act of Parliament, and any rules so made apply to any
prosecution, proceeding, action or appeal, as the case may be, within the jurisdiction of that court,
instituted in relation to any matter of a criminal nature or arising from or incidental to any such
prosecution, proceeding, action or appeal.
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controls the court budget, who controls the hiring and firing of court staff and who controls
the building and maintenance of courthouses and judicial facilities (including security,
information technology, judicial libraries and so forth), although court administration
generally and the rules of court specifically are clearly interrelated.'
A.

PROCEDURAL CODES

Every jurisdiction in Canada has legislation setting out the scope and jurisdiction of
courts, and it is usually as regulations to such statutes that codes of civil procedure are
enacted, which in turn make provision for courts to issue practice directions or otherwise
issue what amounts to delegated regulations regarding the conduct of court (these often relate
to registrar matters such as listing for trial but can also contain significant policy changes,
such as the creation of the commercial list in Ontario).4 Procedural codes usually will set out
the scope of litigation (for example, rules relating to joinder, intervention, consolidation,
etc.), the method of litigation (for example, by application or action) and the conduct of
litigation (for example, mandatory mediation, case management, simplified procedure,
service and discovery, pleadings and examination, trials and appeals, motions and costs).5 As
former Justice John Morden has written, "without fair and effective procedural law there
cannot be substantive justice." 6
Every jurisdiction in Canada also has a body - usually designated as a rules committee
that makes recommendations regarding changes to the rules. Beyond this shared general
approach, the institutional landscape for developing and implementing procedural rules
varies considerably,7 and flows from variations in historical development, legal culture and
statutory priorities.' I wish to classify supervision over rule-making into three broad
categories based on the makeup of such committees: (i) court-led, (ii) executive-led and (iii)

-

6

7

This more general category of questions about court administration also has no simple answer. While
all Canadian jurisdictions are governed by a variation on the "executive model" whereby the Attorney
General is ultimately responsible for court administration, innovations have seen a delegation of
portions of that authority to the judiciary to govern various aspects of court administration or have
various levels of input in budgetary and administrative decision-making Finally, as discussed below
in relation to R. v.Valente, [1985], 2 S.C.R. 673 [Valente], there is a category of court administration
which, as a matter of constitutional principle, must remain underjudicial control, covering such matters
as the setting of trial lists.
See e.g. practice direction relating to Ontario's Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 48, "Listing for Trial," in
James J. Carthy, M.A. Derry Millar & Jeffrey G. Cowan, Ontario Annual Practice 2003-2004 (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 2003). See also Commercial List Practice Direction (1995), 24 O.R. (3d) 455,
discussed in Gary Watson et al., eds., The Civil Litigation Process: Cases and Materials, 5th ed.
(Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1999).
Not all procedural law is set out in these procedural codes. For example, both Ontario and B.C. enacted
separate class action acts to govern the procedures applicable to certifying and litigating class actions.
John Morden, "An Overview of the Rules of Civil Procedure in Ontario" (1984) 5 Advocates Q. 257
at 264.
I am grateful to the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice for making available to me their survey on rule
making across Canada. A summary of this survey was published as "Cross-Country Snapshot of Rules
& Rules Committees" News & Views on Civil Justice Reform 5 (Fall 2002) 15, online: Canadian Forum
on Civil Justice <www.cfcj-fcjc.org/issue 5/n5-transcan.thm>.
See the discussion of the history of court rules and the influence of English and American practice in
Canada in Watson et al., supra note 4.
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collaborative, taking into consideration both the statutory provisions that establish or guide
the work of rules committees and the actual practices of those committees.
In some Canadian settings, the court-led model of rule-making is apparent both in practice
and in design. Importantly, even under the court-led model, thejudicial involvement in rulemaking derives it legitimacy from a statutory mandate. For example, the Supreme CourtAct9
stipulates that amendments to the Rules must be signed by a majority of the Court (in other
words, five judges) and marked with a stamp of approval under the Statutory Instruments
Act' o by the Regulations section of the Department of Justice. The amendments must then be
registered by the Clerk ofthe Privy Council and published in the Canada Gazette. In practice,
the Supreme Court Rules Committee (which consists of three Supreme Courtjudges) consults
directly with members of the Court, court staff, counsel and other groups. The Federal Court
of Canada Rules Committee, also a statutory body," by contrast includes membership from
the federal courts (trial and appellate), a member from the Courts Administration Service and
five members of the Bar (as designated by the Attorney General).' 2
Saskatchewan has adopted a variation on this court-led theme. There, pursuant to the The
Queen's Bench Act, 1998," the Queen's Bench Rules Committee is composed of the Chief
Justice, several Queen's Benchjudges and the Registrar. Amendments approved by the rules
committee are forwarded to a joint committee of the Law Society and the Saskatchewan
branch of the Canadian Bar Association for comment. Following this consultation, the
proposed amendments must be adopted by a majority of the Queen's Bench judges at an en
banc meeting.
The court-led model is thus characterized by a majority of judicial members on a rules
committee and a statutory process for enacting the proposals of the committee, which permits
a minimal role, if any, for the executive and legislative branches. Whether or not the rules
require the imprimatur of the executive (in the form of regulations) or the legislature (in the
form of legislative amendments), the control in this model resides with the court.
By contrast, the executive-led model of rule-making reverses this equation and is
characterized by executive leadership and accountability and usually provides mere
consultation (sometimes mandatory, sometimes optional) with the judiciary. For example,
in British Columbia, the Court Rules Act 4 provides that the Lieutenant Governor in Council
has authority over court rules. The Lieutenant Governor makes rules on the recommendation
of the Attorney General who in turn consults with the Chief Justice of British Columbia. The
Attorney General also appoints members ofthe rules committee, again following consultation
with the court. In New Brunswick, while the Law Society has struck an ad hoc rules

9

10
1
12

"
'4

R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 97.
R.S.C. 1985, c. S-22.
Federal Court Act, S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 45.1.
An analogous format is used for the rules committee of the Tax Court of Canada, which includes the
Chief Judge and Associate Chief Judge of the tax court, two judges of the court, one representative of
the Attorney General and two lawyers designated by the Attorney General.
S.S. 1998, c. Q-I.01, s. 28.
R.S.B.C. 1996. c. 80.
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committee to provide input on major initiatives, the Department of Justice legislative drafting
branch has exclusive authority to draft rules of court.
Finally, there is the truly mixed model of rule-making, which is characterized by a shared
mandate between courts and government and no obvious control by one branch over the
priorities and preferences of the other. This collaborative model often is characterized by a
significant presence of parties or groups that are neither governmental orjudicial, but instead
represent the Bar or the public at large. Ontario falls into this camp, in part because of the
size of its rules committee (29 in total, including 16judges, I1 lawyers (2 of whom are from
the Attorney General) and 2 court administrators). Rules in Ontario typically are drafted by
legislative counsel, approved by the rules committee, reviewed and passed by Cabinet and
published, like other regulations, in the Ontario Gazette. Manitoba has a variation on the
collaborative model, which includes both voting members on the rules committee and nonvoting members representing other legal constituencies.
Twenty-five years ago, when Justice Jules Deschdnes conducted his study of judicial
independence, including in the context of rule-making, he found that, of the 45 courts he
examined, 44 percent could be characterized as "high executive authority," 38 percent could
be characterized as "low executive authority" and 18 percent fell into the middle category,
which he termed "moderate executive authority."'" This likely remains a fair description of
the Canadian rule-making terrain.
The implementation of rules is as significant as their development. While the government
may have varying roles in the development of court rules, it isjudges who interpret and apply
those rules, and it is worth pointing out not only that courts will always reserve a measure of
discretion to interpret and apply rules of court to achieve the interests ofjustice, but also that
many rules themselves contemplate judicial supervision. For example, the Ontario Rules of
Civil Procedureprovide that "[t]he court may, only where and as necessary in the interest of
justice, dispense with compliance of any rule at any time."' 6 Thus, even in jurisdictions that
may not be categorized as "court-led," judicial control over rules may still be apparent. This
will be discussed further below in the context of the inherent powers of the court.
The plurality of forms of rule-making in Canada speaks both to the variety of approaches
of court rules and the flexibility engendered by the absence of strong assertions of unilateral
constitutional authority by either the executive or the judiciary. As I attempt to clarify the
constitutional terrain below, one of two possible implications might arise: first, one or more
of the rules committees now in operation infringe the constitutional authority of either the
government or the judiciary to control court rules; or second, the constitution does not
mandate that either the government or the judiciary need to control some or all court rules.
There is a variation on this second option. If control is not constitutionally mandated, does
the Constitution require at least that the judiciary and government consult over significant
rule changes?

15

1'

Jules Deschcnes, Masters in Their Own House (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1981) [Deschnes
Report].
Ontario, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 2.03.
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It is worth mentioning that there does not appear to be significant unrest from either
governmental or judicial quarters regarding the development or application of procedural
codes is rare. Governments are unlikely to take strong positions on procedural rules and are
even less likely to push through initiatives in this area in the face of judicial opposition,
unless significant resource or policy issues are involved. A possible exception to this claim
might be the controversy raised by the adoption of mandatory and/or court annexed
mediation in several jurisdictions, which some courts have opposed. By contrast,
governments are likely to take strong positions and may have the will to proceed without
judicial support or involvement when it comes to court fees. It is to this intersection of court
rules and core governmental functions such as raising revenue that I now turn.
B.

COURT FEES

Rules committees, as a rule, do not deal with court fees. Fees are dealt with most often as
a simple matter of legislative authority and executive policy. They are typically organized
in a schedule enacted as a regulation to the civil procedure rules. Fees cover a range of civil
litigation instruments, from filing a statement of claim, to motions and examinations, to
retrieving a court document from storage. These fees have been increasing in almost every
jurisdiction in Canada. For government, they have become an increasingly significant
generator of revenue.7
Courts generally have been extremely reticent to constrain the government's spending
power, including its power to charge user fees. 8 While it may make sense to reserve a greater
role to the executive where the raising of revenue is affected (as with decisions to build new
courthouses, adopt new information technologies or other resource intensive issues),there
is little in principle to distinguish rules from fees in terms of the core constitutional principles
of judicial independence, rule of law, access to justice and the inherent power of a court to
control its own process. Where issues of potential disputes between courts, litigants and
governments over court administration have arisen, more often than not, fees and revenues
are involved.
Court fees in civil matters appear to be on the rise in every jurisdiction. In Alberta, they
were recently tripled. The rationale is clear. Governments are cash-strapped and, as
Manitoba's Attorney General, Gord Mackintosh, recently observed in relation to a hike in
trial fees in that province, "Why should the taxpayer subsidize most of the cost of a private
dispute going to trial?"' 9 Mackintosh added, for good measure, that he hoped the increase in
fees would encourage more people to try mediation. Attorneys General around the country,
who once championed the courts and access to them at the cabinet table, are increasingly
asked to justify public expenditures on courts relative to hospitals, schools and roads. Not
only are expenditures under greater scrutiny, but courts are also increasingly viewed as

17

1

19

Fees, of course, may also constitute a significant expense for governments, as government lawyers must
pay these fees unless there is a legislative or regulatory provision exempting the Attorney General from
liability for fees.
See David Mullan, "The Role of the Judiciary in the Review of Administrative Policy Decisions: Issues
of Legality" in Mary Jane Mossman & Ghislain Otis, eds., The Judiciary as Third Branch o/
Government: Manifestations and Challenges to Legitimacy (Montrdal: Les Editions Th6mis, 2000) 311
"New Court Fees Launched" The Lawyers Weekly (17 September 2004) 2.
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potential revenue generators. At a minimum, the civil justice system is expected to operate
on a near cost recovery basis. Further, there is a widely held perception that because judicial
salaries appear high, courts are well resourced.
In some cases, the modification of court fees is a subject of widespread consultation across
an affected court; in other cases, a Chief Justice might be informed of fee increases only days
before they are introduced. Even where the judiciary is consulted or given notice of fee
increases in advance, it is generally with the understanding that this is a courtesy, or to ensure
the government's policy objectives can be achieved, and not because the government believes
it has any responsibility or obligation to involve the court in decision-making relating to fees.
When called upon to rule on the legality or constitutionality of court fees, however, some
judges have subjected fees to surprisingly rigorous scrutiny.
2
For example, in Pleau v. Nova Scotia (Supreme Court, Prothonotary),
MacAdam J. of
the Nova Scotia Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional a variety of new court fees being
introduced in Nova Scotia, including, most controversially, a system of graduated fees that
would result in parties paying more in fees for more time in court. In Polewsky v. Home
HardwareStore Ltd,"1 the Ontario Superior Court held small claims court fees did not offend
any constitutional principle but did find a defect in the inability, under the statute, for ajudge
to waive those fees where a litigant cannot afford to pay them.

These cases demonstrate the willingness of courts to intervene in executive and legislative
policy-making that concerns the courts. The reasoning of the courts in both these decisions
is analyzed in the next section, which attempts to map the constitutional landscape of court
rules, and to which I now turn.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE
The ConstitutionAct, 186722 does not squarely address the question of which branch of
government has primary carriage for court rules. While s. 92(14) of the Constitution Act,
1867 specifically gives to the provinces jurisdiction over "the administration ofjustice," this
only applies to whatever authority is properly legislative (and notjudicial) in the first place.
In other words, that provision clarifies which level of government has legislative authority
over courts, but says little about which branch of government is ultimately responsible for
developing and implementing those rules. Even the clarity regarding provincial authority over
legislation relating to courts is vitiated to some extent by ss. 96- 101 of the ConstitutionAct,
1867, which gives the federal government a lead role in judicial appointments to all superior
courts and contemplates the creation of federal courts, under which both the Supreme Court
and Federal Court of Canada have been established. Today, any approach to the
constitutional landscape of court rules must make sense out of federal courts, provincial
appellate, superior and provincially appointed courts and in some jurisdictions, municipal
courts and the evolving role for justices of the peace, masters and other judicial officers.

20
21
2

(1998), 186 N.S.R. (2d) I (S.C.) [Pleau].
(2003), 66 O.R. (3d) 600 (Sup. Ct. J. (Div. Ct.)) [Polewsky].
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 11,No. 5.
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Once again, this diversity militates for a pluralist approach to rule-making structures, but
pluralism does not have to be, and arguably should not be, divorced from principle.
Below, Iexplore a range of constitutional provisions and principles that touch on the rules
of court. First, I examine the constitutional principle ofjudicial independence. This is a wellknown and well-trodden aspect of constitutional law. For the purposes of this analysis, my
interest is in the intersection of administrative independence and the rules of court. As part
of this exploration, I examine the inherent powers doctrine, a familiar aspect of the
constitutional terrain in the United States and largely uncharted territory in Canada. Second,
I consider the emerging constitutional principle of access to justice and the related doctrine
of the rule of law.
The backdrop for this review of constitutional principles relating to the rules of court is
the broader set of constitutional principles that define the Westminster system of government
- principally, the separation of powers, parliamentary supremacy and ministerial
responsibility. There is neither the space nor the need to fully explore these constitutional
foundations here. However, these principles raise (at least) two central challenges for
judicial control over court rules. First, parliamentary supremacy suggests that courts, even
superior courts with inherent jurisdiction, are subject to legislative rule-making, and it is for
the government, ultimately, to decide on the kind of civil litigation system that it believes to
be in the public's interest. If the threshold for small claims courts, or simplified procedure
is to be raised, this argument goes, it is only appropriate for this decision to reside with the
government, which has the democratic legitimacy to choose policy preferences and the
legislative or administrative form they might take. Even where courts have rule-making
authority, this must result from either an explicit or implicit ceding by Parliament of its rulemaking authority to the courts. As the Desch~nes Report, Masters in Their Own House
asserted of rule-making, "[b]y definition, this is a power delegated by Parliament to the
Courts."24

This leads to the second challenge, which concerns accountability. Ministers are
responsible (in theory, at least) for all acts of the executive. Since virtually all court staff
(registrars, clerks, court managers, etc.), except judges, report to the Attorney General, the
minister must exercise sufficient control to remain accountable for the performance of court
administration. The flipside of this accountability coin, of course, is that judges cannot be
directly accountable to the government for court administration. While government in these
contexts typically refersjust to the executive, and while there is some significant divergence
in the dynamics underlying the relationship between courts and the executive on the one
hand, and courts and the legislative branch on the other, for the purposes of simplicity in this
analysis, I refer simply to control over rules by the court or control over rules by the

See Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2003).

Deschdnes Report, supra note 15 at 13 1. Deschdnes was here referring to the provision of the Criminal
Code that expressly gives courts the authority to adopt "rules of court" which govern "pleadings,
practice and procedure" and which must be published in the Canada Gazette. Deschenes goes on to
observe, however, that, "[t]he legislative power, which delegates this rule making function could, in
fact, always make its own legislation on the subject.... Nothing would prevent it from repealing or
amending, on its own authority, rules adopted by a court, be if federal or provincial" (ibid. at 132).

ALBERTA LAW REVIEW

(2005) 42:3

government - whether the government exercises its control by means of legislation,
regulation or other government action is not central to this analysis.
It is with these two challenges in mind that I now turn to the two major constitutional
principles animatingjudicial control over court rules: the principle ofjudicial independence
and the principle of access to justice.
A.

THE DYNAMIC OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

In this section, I explore the familiar and oft litigated doctrine ofjudicial independence,
including the less well explored terrain of the "inherent powers" doctrine, both of which
touch on the rules of court.
While the presence and importance ofthe constitutional principle ofjudicial independence
is beyond dispute in Canada, the source of that authority is neither uniform nor self-evident.25
Sections 96-100 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provide for the creation of courts and the
appointment of judges, but do not set out limitations on the scope of judicial review, nor
provide any mechanism for judicial accountability. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has
interpreted these provisions as implying a regime of judicial independence in Canada. In
Cooper v. Canada(Human Rights Commission),26 for example, Lamer C.J.C. affirmed that
the primary source for the judiciary's independence is ss. 96-100 of the Constitution Act,
1867.27 A secondary source for judicial independence was found to be the Preamble to the
ConstitutionAct, 1867, which states that Canada is to have a Constitution similar in principle
to that of the United Kingdom.2" While not necessary to the dispute at issue, in Cooper Lamer
C.J.C. proceeded to assert that these provisions of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 are not merely
concerned with judicial independence but also with the judiciary as a constitutionally
separate branch of government.
The rationale of and justification for judicial independence is to ensure impartiality in
adjudication.29 It is a right of the litigant, in other words, not of the judge (individually) or
the court (institutionally)." To the degree to which it is perceived that the rules of court are
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W.R. Lederman, "The Independence of the Judiciary" (1956) 34 Can. Bar Rev. 769, 1139, reprinted
in W.R. Lederman, Continuing Constitutionat Dilemmas: Essays on the Constitutional History, Public
Law and Federal System of Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981 ) 109.
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 854 [Cooper].
Chief Justice Lamer explained, "Although the wording of this provision suggests that it is solely
concerned with the appointment ofjudges, through judicial interpretation - an important element of
which has been the recognition that s.96 must be read along with ss. 97-100 as part of an integrated
whole - s. 96 has come to guarantee the core jurisdiction of the superior courts against legislative
encroachment" (ibid at 871). See also Robin Elliot, "Rethinking Section 96: From a Question of Power
to a Question of Rights" in Denis Magnusson & Daniel Soberman, eds., Canadian Constitutional
Dilemmas Revisited (Kingston: Institute of intergovernmental Relations, 1997) 17.
Chief Justice Lamer cited the following passage from Dickson C.J.C.'s reasons in Beauregard v.
Canada, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 56 at 72: "Since judicial independence has been for centuries an important
principle of the Constitution of the United Kingdom, it is fair to infer that it was transferred to Canada
by the constitutional language of the preamble" (Cooper, ibid. at 872-73).
R. v.Lippi, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114.
Mackin v.New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] I S.C.R. 405.
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controlled by external forces, even governmental ones, the perception of impartiality of the
courts will be affected.
The content of this constitutional principle was set out in Valente,3 and consists of three
discrete but related forms of protection: security of tenure, financial independence and
administrative independence. In Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial
Court of PrinceEdward Island,32 the Supreme Court struck down a number of provinces'
attempt to curtail or cut the salaries of provincially appointed judges (federally appointed
judges have their salary fixed by the federal government). The relationship between the
remuneration issue and court rules is explored below. Both areas depend on an understanding
of the separation of powers in Canada and the "grundnorm" orjudicial independence, which
is freedom from political interference or the appearance of it. As Lamer C.J.C. stated,
referring to the requirement that the financial security of courts be free from political
interference:
These different components of the institutional financial security of the courts inhere, in my view, in a
fundamental principle of the Canadian Constitution, the separation of powers. As I discussed above, the
institutional independence of the courts is inextricably bound up with the separation of powers, because in
order to guarantee that the courts can protect the Constitution, they must be protected by a set of objective
33
guarantees against intrusions by the executive and legislative branches of government.

Chief Justice Lamer held that the remuneration of provincial judges could not be subject
to government wide cuts because to do so would compromise the independence of the
judiciary, contrary to the unwritten guarantee of judicial independence incorporated in
Canada through the Preamble of the ConstitutionAct, 1867.34
While security of tenure and financial independence aspects ofj udicial independence have
both a personal and an institutional dimension, the third aspect - administrative
independence - only has an institutional dimension. As Lamer C.J.C. stated in the Re
ProvincialCourt Judges, "administrative independence ... only attaches to the court as an
institution (although sometimes it may be exercised on behalf of a court by its chiefjudge or
justice). 35 In Valente, LeDain J. had stated that an "essential condition of judicial
independence" was control by the courts over the administrative decisions that bear "directly
[and immediately] on the exercise of [theljudicial function., 36 Those types of decisions were
described in this way:
Judicial control over ... assignment ofjudges, sittings of the court, and court lists - as well as the related
matters of allocation of court rooms and direction of the administrative staff engaged in carrying out these
functions, has generally been considered the essential or minimum requirement for institutional or "collective"
37

independence.
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While it is difficult to construe court rules as not bearing directly on the adjudicative
function, the more compelling argument may be that court rules are not administrative at all.
Arguably, however, to the extent that the rules of court impinge on judicial functions, and
assuming these are imposed by the legislature or executive rather than developed with or by
judges, than this interferes with judicial independence. On this reasoning, however, most of
the civil procedure codes in Canada and virtually all of the court fees regimes, are
constitutionally vulnerable. Chief Justice Green recently faced a similar conceptual dilemma
in a case that raised whether all court staff must be under the direction and control of the
judiciary to comply with the constitutional requirements of administrative independence for
courts. He sidestepped the dilemma in the following fashion:
It is not necessary to attempt to define the outer parameters of administrative independence as it relates to the
direction and control of court staff. It is sufficient, for the purposes of this case, to recognize that some

administrative functions performed by court staff are protected, by the constitutional principle of judicial
independence, from interference from outside the judiciary. To that extent, the principle of judicial
independence ensures that direction and control over court staff for such purposes is exercisable by the
38
judiciary and no one else.

Similarly, I would assert that, leaving aside the outer boundaries of the territory, at least some
court rules that go to the heart of adjudication (for example, rules which limit or modify the
discretion of the Court to identify and remedy abuse of process or core components of
judicial discretion) fall into a protected sphere ofjudicial independence. Or, put differently,
it is difficult to see how they would not when one considers the constitutional principle of
judicial independence and the logic of Valente in isolation. When one views this principle
as in tension with the principles of Parliamentary supremacy and ministerial responsibility,
however, the case for full judicial control resonates less and the case for constitutional
accommodation is apparent.
Judicial independence, then (including administrative independence) operates to "insulate
the courts. ' ' 39 That insulation, however, also removes any possibility of traditional,
democratic accountability for the governance of courts and those aspects of court
administration entirely under judicial control. This is not to suggest that those traditional
forms of democratic accountability are themselves effective (for example, ministerial
responsibility for courts is already compromised by the perceived conflict of the Attorney

3

Newfoundland and LabradorAssociation of Public and Private Employees v. Newfoundland and

Labrador (Minister of Justice) (2004), 237 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 94 at para. 128 [emphasis in original]
[NAPE]. See also the Ontario Court of Appeal's approach to the scope of judicial independence in
relation to whether judicial secretaries could be unionized: "There can be no question that judges'
secretaries perform vital and essential tasks with respect to the administration ofjustice. It is difficult
to imagine the performance of the judicial role without their invaluable support. It was therefore
manifestly appropriate that in OPSEU v. The Crovn, supra, the OLRB described their services as
essential to the proper administration of the courts" (Ontario (A.G.) v. Ontario Public Service
Employees Union (2000), 52 O.R. (3d) 77 at para. 14 (C.A.) [Ontario v.OPSEU]). I see nothing
inherent in the concept of judicial independence that entitles the judiciary presumptively to deprive
employees with whom it works of the right to union membership. There may be rare instances where
such membership collides with judicial independence, but this case falls far short of any of the
principles set out in Manitoba Provincial Court Judges Association v. Manitoba (Minister ofiJustice),

[1997] 3 S.C.R. 3; and Valente, supra note 3.
Re Provincial Court Judges, supra note 32 at para. 130.
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General being a central litigant before the courts), nor that courts cannot be accountable to
commissions, intermediating bodies or other institutional representations of the public
interest. In any event, it is daunting if not impossible to reconcile direct accountability to
what Lamer C.J.C. referred to in the Re ProvincialCourt Judges as the threat of interference
from "the public generally."
The high water mark of separation of courts from public accountability is the notion of the
courts possessing "inherent powers" to control their own process and to be insulated from
dependence on "an extrinsic will." 4
I.

INHERENT POWERS

An aspect ofjudicial independence I wish to highlight in relation to court rules is the more
specific doctrine referred to as the "inherent powers" doctrine. This doctrine does not
contemplate judicial control over court rules in Canada but I believe provides a helpful
window into howjudicial control over rules may be elevated to a constitutional concern. This
doctrine is typically understood as uniquely American, which provides courts with an
inherent right to direct and control any aspect necessary to carry out the judicial function
(from budgets to personnel) and rules. Felix Stumpf describes the doctrine in the following
terms:
The doctrine of inherent power runs essentially as follows: the courts are a constitutionally created branch of
government whose continued effective functioning is indispensable; performance of that constitutional
function isa responsibility committed to the courts; this responsibility implies the authority necessary to carry
it out; therefore the courts have the authority to raise money to sustain their essential functions. (Hazard,
4 1
McNamara and Sentilles, "Court Finance and Unitary Budgeting," 81 Yale L.J. 1286, 1287 (1972)).
42
The traditional view is that the inherent powers doctrine has no analogue in Canada.
Stumpf himself noted, "the doctrine is uniquely American; it has no counterpart in England,
which has no written constitution or separation of powers. 43 Of course, Canada now has a
written constitution and arguably an increasingly refined doctrine of separation of powers.
For this and other reasons, the courts appear less reticent to explore the contours and
implications of inherent powers in the Canadian context. However, while the doctrine has
arisen most often in American state courts in the context of budgetary disputes, it has
emerged in Canada as a residual category governing court practice and the conduct of
proceedings. In R. v. Felderhof 4" the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed the wide ambit of
judicial authority over the courtroom, including the conduct of a trial. As Rosenberg J.A.
observed:
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See Smith v.Miller 384 P.2d 738 at 741 (1963), discussed in Carl Baar. "Judicial Activism in State
Courts: The Inherent Powers Doctrine" in John C. Gatsley, Inherent Powers of the Court (Reno: The
National Judicial College, 1980) 1.
Felix F.Stumpf, Inherent Powers ofthe Courts: Si,ordandShieldofthe Judiciary (Reno: The National
Judicial College, 1994) at 4.
Perry Millar & Carl Baar, JudicialAdmninistration in Canada (Kingston and Montreal: The InstitutC of
Public Administration of Canada/McGill-Queen's University Press, 1981).
Stumpf, supra note 41 at 6.
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Whatever may have been the case in the past, it is no longer possible to view the trial judge as little more than
a referee who must sit passively while counsel call the case in any fashion they please. Until relatively recently
a long trial lasted for one week, possibly two. Now, it is not unusual for trials to last for many months, if not
years. Early in the trial or in the course of a trial, counsel may make decisions that unduly lengthen the trial
or lead to a proceeding that is almost unmanageable. It would undermine the administration ofjustice if a trial
judge had no power to intervene at an appropriate time and, like this trial judge, after hearing submissions,
make directions necessary to ensure that the trial proceeds in an orderly manner. I do not see this power as a
limited one resting solely on the court's power to intervene to prevent an abuse of its process. Rather, the
5
power is founded on the court's inherent jurisdiction to control its own process.4

Justice Rosenberg proceeded to affirm that statutory courts, such as a provincial offences or
municipal court, also have the implied power to control their own process. 46 Of course, a
judge's inherent power to control process is not the same as an inherent powers doctrine in
the American sense of the term. There is no necessary connection between controlling
process and controlling resources. This does not suggest, however, one more aspect of court
rules that lay outside the province of the executive to unilaterally determine. In light of the
discussion above, it is clear that court rules that impinge on adjudicative independence or that
interfere with a judge's control of her or his own "process" may be vulnerable to challenge
or non-enforcement. However, while much of court administration may appear outside the
sphere of these doctrines (human resources policy in a registrar's office may not bear directly
on adjudication), most of the rules of court do shape and constrain a court's process and do
bear directly on adjudicative functions. Thus,judicial independence is inextricably linked to
many, if not most, rules of court; yet it can it be construed as interference with that
independence for a government to pursue a mandate of serving the public interest through
reforming judicial processes. Rather than exclude government from the administration of
justice, judicial independence, in my view, militates for a requirement ofjudicial acceptance
of significant reform initiatives that bear on adjudicative functions.
B.

ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW

The concept of access to justice reflects several perspectives on socialjustice and barriers
in the justice system - it has spawned a prodigious literature in Canada and other common
lawjurisdictions with civil justice systems. 47 The constitutional principle of access tojustice,
however, is considerably narrower in scope and of considerably more recent vintage, at least
in Canada. In BritishColumbiaGovernment Employees' Union v. British Columbia(A.G.), 4
Dickson C.J.C. outlined the rationale for recognizing the principles of"access tojustice" and
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Ibid. at para. 40 [emphasis added].
Justice Rosenberg relied on R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575, in which the Supreme
Court confirmed the jurisdiction of the Provincial Offences Court of Ontario to grant remedies under
s.24(l) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. II [Charter].
For just a sampling, see Mary Jane Mossman & Heather Ritchie, "Access to Civil Justice: A Review
of Canadian Legal Academic Scholarship 1977-1987" in Allan Hutchinson, ed., Access to CivilJustice
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990) 53. See also Roderick MacDonald, "Access to Justice and Law Reform"
(1990) 10 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 287; lan Morrison & Janet Mosher, "Barriers to Access to Civil
Justice for Disadvantaged Groups" in Rethinking Civil Justice: Research Studies for the Civil Justice
Review, vol. 2 (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1996) 637.
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the "rule of law" as aspects of the Canadian Constitution entrenched, like judicial
independence, both through the Preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867, and implicitly
through the Charter.He stated:
So we see that the rule of law is the very foundation of the Charter. Let us turn then to s. 52(l) of the
ConstitutionAct, 1982 which states that the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada and any law
that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or
effect.... [lit would be inconceivable that Parliament and the provinces should describe in such detail the rights
and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and should not first protect that which alone makes it in fact possible
to benefit from such guarantees, that is, access to a court. As the Court of Human Rights truly stated: "The
fair, public and expeditious characteristics ofjudicial proceedings are of no value at all if there are nojudicial
proceedings". And so it is in the present case. Of what value are the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter if a person isdenied or delayed access to a court of competentjurisdiction in order to vindicate them?
How can the courts independently maintain the rule of law and effectively discharge the duties imposed by
the Charter if court access is hindered, impeded or denied? The Charter protections would become merely
49
a illusory, the entire Charter undermined.

In that case, the Supreme Court upheld an injunction issued by a trial judge in British
Columbia, on his own initiative, barring striking workers from picketing on the courthouse
steps and impeding access by the public to the courthouse. In short, the Court held that the
rule of law forms the infrastructure of the constitution and that the rule of law is contingent
on access to justice, which in turn must presuppose access to courts. The Court in BCGEU
made clear that interference "from whatever source" falls into the same category as an
infringement of access. In his earlier decision in NAPE v. Newfoundland (A.G.), 5" Dickson
C.J.C. had asserted that "[t]he rule of law, enshrined in our constitution, can only be
maintained if persons have unimpeded, uninhibitedaccess to the courts of this country."'"
In NAPE, Green C.J. of the Newfoundland Supreme Court relied on this authority, in part,
to justify why, on constitutional grounds, certain court staff could not be permitted to
participate in a general public service labour disruption. Chief Justice Green asserted:
Surely, the refusal of court staff to perform any of their functions - be it processing files in the Registry,
dealing with counsel, attending in court, operating the recording equipment, reproducing and inscribing court
orders, or ensuring service and enforcement - is an even greater threat to the ability of citizens to get access
to the courts to have their cases heard than the erection of picket lines which might (or might not) be effective
in persuading persons not to attend court. If the staff are not present, the court cannot even open for regular
business. The public cannot have, in the words of Chafe "unimpeded, uninhibited access" if the courts are shut
52
down because of a strike.

Are picketers on the courthouse steps, or court staff who walk off the job in a labour
disruption, any more a barrier to the courthouse doors than limitations of standing, time,
venue or fees? Certainly, far more people are denied access on a continual basis on these
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grounds than those denied access on a temporary basis due to labour disruptions or protests.
Is any rule or fee unconstitutional if a persuasive case can be made that it impedes or inhibits
access? Does it matter whether the impeding, inhibiting force is a governmental one rather
than a union or protesting organization?
In Pleau, alluded to above, MacAdam J. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court addressed
these questions indirectly in the course of elaborating on the relationship between access to
justice and court fees in the following terms:
Access to justice is neither a service nor a commodity. It is a constitutional right of all citizens; any
impediments must be strictly scrutinized. Regardless of whether the impediment takes the form of a tax, a fee,
an allowance, or some other form, it will, and must fail if its effect is to unduly "impede, impair or delay
53
access to the courts."

Later in the same judgment, MacAdam J. returned to this theme and observed the following:
Fees that have an incidental, but real, effect on access to the courts or justice may have as much impact on
access as fees directly related to the judge or the court's time, Here the Hearing Fee is structured on the use
of facilities and staff but directly relates to the accessibility of the judge. Fees related to the provision of
services, such as for the commencement of a legal proceeding, setting down for trial, as a penalty for wastage
of resources caused by late trial adjournments and for summoning juries involve the processes in getting to
trial or to the court and providing they are not so inordinate as to effectively "impede, impair or delay" access
to the courts, the provisions of the Act permit them and nothing under the Constitution, both written and
54
unwritten, preclude them.

Of course, this constitutional principle must include a balance, an appreciation of the
legitimate interest of the government in recovering a portion of the outlay in providing court
services and the limiting effects of socioeconomic inequality on access tojustice. As Lambert
J.A. noted in John Carten PersonalLaw Corp. v. British Columbia (A.G.),55 in which filing
fees were unsuccessfully challenged:
There are many reasons why the cost of legal services, or a lack of funds, may restrict, hamper, or even prevent
a person from exercising rights of access to the courts or rights of access to other legal services. What would
be required in order to find this Act [SocialServices TaxAct] wholly unconstitutional, or even unconstitutional
in its application to a particular case, would be proof that people, or a class of people, in general, or some
person in particular, who would have been able to exercise the legal rights in question if this tax were not in
effect, were or was prevented by this tax from exercising those rights.... What would be required would be
proofthat the right was denied, or its exercise was prevented, by the existence or operation of this tax. In other
words, that a right which would have been exercised but for this tax could not be exercised because of this
tax. 56
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This line of reasoning can take the search for an appropriate balance in one of two
directions: either fees should be income contingent so that everyone's financial burden
remains proportional to their ability to pay (and where one has no ability, presumably one
would have no burden); or a court must have the discretion to waive fees in particular cases
of hardship. Both of these policy responses to the problem of access raise the legal question
of how to distinguish a reasonable from an unreasonable fee (and also raise the issue of what
a court can and should do if it concludes that a fee is unreasonable).
A "reasonable fee," defined, however, cannot be said to infringe access to justice. But
what is "reasonable" goes, of course, to the heart of the access principle. Should it be
proportional to wealth or income, should it be left to judicial discretion, should it differ
according to the gravity of the matter or should it "float" according to a range of factors in
the fashion of costs awards? Justice MacAdam grappled with this issue to some extent in
Pleau and concluded in a somewhat circular fashion:
A reasonable fee is neither an impediment, impairment or cause for delay. A reasonable fee, however, isnot
necessarily a full reimbursement for the costs of the services. In many cases, it will be substantially less than
the costs of the services. Otherwise valid reasonable fees, will lose their constitutional validity, in
57
circumstances that cause them to "impede, impair or delay" access to the courts.

The question of fees and access to justice was also the subject of the judgment in
Polewsky, referred to above."8 Polewsky involved four separate actions in the Small Claims
Court, each of which required Mr. Polewsky to pay the $50 fee required to file his claims.
In one of those actions, he brought a motion seeking a waiver of the fee required to have his
actions placed on the trial list. Deputy Judge Shields granted this motion,"9 in part based on
an affidavit indicating that legal aid was not available to a litigant in Small Claims Court.
Subsequently, a series of similar motions were heard by Gillese J., who found that in the
absence of an express statutory power to waive fees, a Small Claims Court judge has no
jurisdiction to do so. On the constitutional issue, she held that there is no constitutional right
of unimpeded access to the civil courts and that the fees do not violate s. 15 of the Charter,
since poverty is not an analogous ground under s. 15(1). She further found, in obiter, that s.
7 of the Charterwould also provide no redress in these circumstances. The Divisional Court
upheld the ruling ofGillese J. with respect to her interpretation of the statute and her rulings
on the Charter.The Divisional Court accepted, however, a common law right of access to
justice applied to these circumstances, relying in part on Witham.6"
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Pleau, supra note 20 at para. 105. This passage is similar to one in R. v. Lord Chancelor, exparte
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The Divisional Court held that a citizen's right to access to the courts to enforce his or her
civil rights is a common law constitutional right that can only be abrogated by clear and
express statutory language, though that right of access was held "subject to the caveats of
merit and proof of indigence."'" The Court in Polewsky nonetheless affirmed, as in Pleau,
that in Canada, "quite apart from the Charter,there is at common law a constitutional right
of access to the courts. ' 62 The Court linked this constitutional principle of access directly to
the court's guardianship function over the rule of law, which, as the Court notes, both stands
independently of the Charterand at the same time provides a foundation for the Charter.The
Court concluded:
We agree that the Rule of Law infuses this court's determination of the issues raised in this appeal. We say
that the existence of the Rule of Law combined with what we find to be the common law constitutional right
of access to justice compels the enactment of statutory provisions that permit persons to proceed informa
pauperis in the Small Claims Court. 63

In the result in Polewsky, while the Court effectively ordered the Ontario Government to
legislatively provide for a discretion to waive fees in the case of indigent litigants, the Court
applied a "but for" test to the actual circumstances of the case before it and concluded that
Mr. Polewsky had not demonstrated that his access to the Small Claims Court would be
impeded but for a waiver or reduction of fees.' In other words, had such a discretion been
available, the Court would not have exercised it in favour of Mr. Polewsky, resulting in a
pyrrhic victory at best for his personal crusade against court fees.
The connection between access to justice and an indigent's ability to afford litigation has
also received recognition from the Supreme Court. In the recent case, British Columbia
(MinisterofForests)v. OkanaganIndian Band,65 the Court affirmed a trial judge's discretion
to provide interim costs to an impecunious litigant in advance of a proceeding if it would not
otherwise be possible for the litigation to go forward. On the subject of the costs rule, Lebel
J. observed:
Another consideration relevant to the application of costs rules is access tojustice. This factor has increased
in importance as litigation over matters of public interest has become more common, especially since the
advent of the Charter. In special cases where individual litigants of limited means seek to enforce their
constitutional rights, courts often exercise their discretion on costs so as to avoid the harshness that might
result from adherence to the traditional principles. This helps to ensure that ordinary citizens have access to
66
the justice system when they seek to resolve matters of consequence to the community as a whole.
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While the right of access to justice and the judicial role in safeguarding that right are now
well recognized in Canadian constitutional law, it is unclear from Pleau and Polewsky
whether this right is only a negative one (in other words, one in which legislative provisions
or government acts that impede access may be challenged and invalidated in court) or also
a positive one (in other words, one in which government must proactively ensure access to
the courts).
In light ofthe recent case law, should we approach access tojustice the way we dojudicial
independence and look to "objective guarantees" such as independent commissions to also
take responsibility over setting court fees? Or should we approach the question as one
integrated with court rules generally, so that rules committees or other collaborative bodies
should have control over or at least a veto function in relation to fees? Or finally, is the right
approach simply that courts have the authority and responsibility to subject those fees to
scrutiny, where challenged, and to rule accordingly on a case-by-case basis? Should
government remain free to set fees as it wishes (subject to Eurig Estate (Re)6 7 and other
constitutional constraints)? If we conclude that judicial input or control is required on the
question of fees on the grounds of access, then how can we distinguish fees from the funding
for legal aid programs, or the capital investment in courthouses and court administration
generally. Once again, this leads us to a question of boundaries, and to the simple question
with which we began - when it comes to the rules of court, where do the legislative,
executive and judicial roles and responsibilities begin and end? It is to elaborate on this
answer that, by way of conclusion, I now turn.
IV.

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION

I wish to suggest that a framework of constitutional compromise and institutional
interdependence is the most effective mechanism for (avoiding and) resolving potential
disputes involving court rules and fees that otherwise could threaten the integrity and
viability of the administration of justice. Such a framework requires surmounting a thin or
superficial view of separation of powers and viewing the key principles at stake, such as
Parliamentary supremacy, ministerial responsibility, judicial independence and access to
justice as complementary.

In the past, calls for collaboration (there have been many) have usually boiled down to
proposals for advisory committees or management boards composed of some collection of
judges or judicial designates, politicians or political designates, civil servants and
occasionally members of "stakeholder" groups. There are several of these collaborative
committees in existence in Canada - one of the longest running and most successful is the
Manitoba Court Executive Board - although few have any real decision-making power.
Ireland has adopted a more robust version of this model for a range of court administration
- the Board of the Irish Court Service consists of eight judges (including four chief
justices/court presidents or anotherjudge they nominate; three judges from each court below

merit to warrant pursuit. And there must be special circumstances sufficient to satisfy the court that
the case is within the narrow class of cases where this extraordinary exercise of its powers is
appropriate (ibid. at para. 36).
[1998] 2 S.C.R. 565; the effect of Eurig is that fees, which are in excess of full cost recovery for a
particular service, or bear no relation to a reasonable fee for that service, must be introduced as a tax.
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the Supreme Court, each one elected by judges of their court; and one judge nominated by
national Chief Justice) and eight non-judges (including three nominated by the Ministry but
only one from within the Ministry, one CEO of Courts Service, one member of Courts
Service staff elected by staff, one barrister nominated by Chair of the Bar Council, one
solicitor nominated by the President of the Law Society of Ireland and one nominee of the
Irish Congress of Trade Unions).
While the Desch~nes Report,68 the Zuber Inquiry,69 the Blair Civil Justice Review7 ° and
other studies have all recommended collaborative boards and councils of varying sizes,
dimensions and responsibilities, perhaps the best known example of an aspiration for a
similar sort of body in Canada emanated from Martin Friedland's landmark study A Place
Apart: JudicialIndependenceandAccountabilityin Canada.7' While this study does not deal
with the rules of court per se, Friedland argues for a Board of Judicial Management that
would function much like the governing council of a university, with appointments coming
not just from government and the judiciary but from the law society, bar association and law
deans.
Whatever might be the merits of managing courts by committee, and with the evident
success of rules committees across various jurisdictions in Canada, my interest here is not in
the institutional forms of collaboration but rather in the institutional forms for resolving the
constitutional dilemma raised by a shared role in rule-making between government and the
courts, although these are clearly interrelated issues. What is glaringly absent from the terrain
of rule-making in Canada is a credible forum for resolving disputes between government and
courts (which would also have a strong dispute avoidance function. While such a dispute
resolution entity could take several forms, the most familiar and palatable form would likely
be an independent commission.
One cannot raise the possibility of a commission to address disputes between the
government and the courts without dealing with the now significant adversarial baggage
accumulated from a decade of litigation over the issue ofjudicial remuneration. While these
independent remuneration commissions serve a different purpose (that of setting salaries
prospectively rather then resolving disputes retrospectively), they engage similar issues in
terms of the search for a body and a process that is compatible with judicial independence
while not usurping the legitimate role for government in setting its fiscal and policy priorities
in a manner of its choosing. Below, I look more closely at the remuneration litigation in order
to determine whether the commission model is well-suited to the context of rule-making, and
if so, how its form and mandate should be crafted.

68
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70
71

Supra note 15.

Ontario, Report of Ontario Courts Inquiry, by T.G. Zuber (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Attorney
General, 1987).
Ontario Civil Justice Review, Civil JusticeReview: Supplemental and Final Report (Toronto: Ontario
Civil Justice Review, 1996) (Co-chairs: Robert A. Blair & Heather Cooper).
Martin Friedland, A Place Apart: JudicialIndependence and Accountability in Canada (Ottawa:
Canadian Justice Council, 1995).
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THE FINAL ARBITER? CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION
72
THROUGH REMUNERATION COMMISSIONS

A.

As the Supreme Court established in the Re ProvincialCourt Judges, the constitutional
principle ofjudicial independence requires that the setting ofjudicial salaries be undertaken
by independent remuneration commission.73 However, to reconcile this practice with the
policy demands of government, the Court provided a mechanism for the government to
modify or reject the recommendations of these commissions. The courts' involvement in
resolving disputes over judicial independence raises the possibility of inherent conflicts of
interest. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the realm of financial independence.
Allocating funds to public goods, services and programs typically is a matter for political
judgment and outside the sphere of judicial involvement.74 Allocating funds to courts and
judicial salaries represents an important exception to that rule. The Court reviewing the
government's justification for rejecting or modifying ajudicial compensation commission's
recommendation is to defer to the government on a standard of "simple rationality." Chief
Justice Lamer, writing for the majority in the Re ProvincialCourtJudges, introduced this
standard and distinguished it from the s. I standard under the Charterin the following way:
The standard of justification here, by contrast, is one of simple rationality.It requires that the government
articulate a legitimate reason for
why it has chosen to depart from the recommendation of the commission, and
if applicable, why it has chosen to treat judges differently from other persons paid from the public purse. A
reviewing court does not engage in a searching analysis of the relationship between the ends and the means,
which is the hallmark ofa s. I analysis. However, the absence of this analysis does not mean that the standard
ofjustification is ineffectual. On the contrary, it has two aspects. First, it screens out decisions with respect
to judicial remuneration which are based on purely political considerations, or which are enacted for
discriminatory reasons. Change to or freezes in remuneration can only be justified for reasons which relate
to the public interest, broadly understood. Second, ifjudicial review is sought, a reviewing court must inquire
into the reasonableness of the factual foundation of the claim made by the government, similar to the way that
we have evaluated whether there was an economic emergency in Canada in our jurisprudence under the
75
division of powers.

As has become clear in subsequent litigation on the meaning of this standard, simple
rationality is anything but simple.76 During this term, the Court granted leave to perhaps the
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Portions of this analysis are drawn from "Developments in Administrative Law: the 2002-2003 Term"
(2003) 22 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 21.
Typically, these commissions follow a tripartite labour arbitration model, where one member of the
commission is chosen by the government, one member by the judiciary and a chair appointed jointly
by the other two.
See Geoffrey Cowper & Lorne Sossin, "Does Canada Need a Political Questions Doctrine?" (2002) 16
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 343.
Re ProvincialCourt Judges, supra note 32 at para. 183.
See e.g. Re British Columbia Legislative Assembly Resolution on JudicialCompensation (1998), 160
D.L.R. (4th) 477 (B.C.C.A.); Alberta ProvincialJudges 'Assn. v.Alberta (1999), 237 A.R. 276 (C.A.)
[AlbertaProvincialJudges'Assn. ]; NewfoundlandAssn. ofProvincial Court Judges v. Newfoundland
(2000), 192 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 183 (Nfld. C.A.); Conference desjuges du Quebec c.Quibec (P.G.)
(2000), 196 D.L.R. (4th) 533 (Que. C.A.) [Confirence dejuges du Qudbecl; ManitobaProvincial
Judges'Assn. v. Manitoba(Minister of Justice) (2001), 202 D.L.R. (4th) 698 (Man. Q.B.) [Manitoba
ProvincialJudges 'Assn.]; OntarioJudges'Assn. v. Ontario(ManagementBoard)(2002), 58 O.R. (3d)
186 (Div. Ct.) [OntarioJudges'Assn.]; Bodner v. Alberta (2002), 317 A.R. 112 (C.A.) [Bodner];
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most contentious dispute involving this standard in Bodner v. Alberta." What follows are
some preliminary thoughts on the challenges posed by Bodner and its sister litigation to the
Court's evolving understanding of deference.
In Bodner, the second major litigation arising from Alberta in the wake of the Re
ProvincialCourtJudges,7" the Alberta Court of Appeal upheld a decision of the trial judge
that the refusal of the Alberta Government to implement recommendations of a judicial
on salaries forjustices of the peace failed to meet the standard of
compensation commission
"simple rationality."79 Justice Paperny, writing for the majority of the Court of Appeal,
described this standard ofjustification as follows:
[Tihe standard ofjustification for rejection must be congruent with the constitutional purpose of a commission.
This means that before government can constitutionally resort to its power to reject, it must first demonstrate
that extraordinary circumstances of sufficient importance or significance exist. Having done so, the reasons
must then pass the test of rationality in this constitutional context: they must be reasonable, their factual
foundation must be reasonable, they cannot be utilized as80 a means of economic manipulation and they must
have a rational connection to the circumstances alleged.

The Alberta Court of Appeal's two-pronged approach tojustification (first demonstrating
extraordinary circumstances and second demonstrating that the government's response is
reasonable) failed to persuade the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, which held that the
"simply rational" standard implied a more deferential degree of scrutiny.
In New Brunswick ProvincialJudges'Association,8' the Court of Appeal found no basis
on the "simply rational" standard to interfere with the Government's decision to reject the
recommendations of a salary commission. Justice Robertson, writing for the Court in the New
Brunswick Provincial Judges' Association case, said of this issue, "In summary, the
understanding that a government cannot depart from a salary recommendation without first
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Provincial Court Judges 'Assn. ofNeiv Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice) (2003), 260
N.B.R. (2d) 201 (C.A.) [New Brunswick Provincial Judges'Assn.].
lbid This appeal is discussed in Kenneth Lysyk & Lorne Sossin, "Judges" in Kenneth Lysyk & Lorne
Sossin, eds., Barristers and Solicitors in Practice, looseleaf (Toronto: Butterworths, 1998) I1.01.
The first litigation resulted from the Alberta Government's rejection of salary recommendations made
by a salary commission in June of 1998 on the grounds that other public servants in Alberta had had
their salaries reduced or frozen over the period in which the commission had recommended judges
receive a salary increase. The government's response was upheld in Alberta Provincial Judges 'Assn.,
supra note 76, leave to appeal to the S.C.C. denied, [2000] I S.C.R. xviii.
A salary commission was established in 1999 to deal with the salaries ot'justices of the peace. It issued
a report on 29 February 2000, proposing substantial increases. Before then, the salary ofjustices of the
peace in Alberta had remained at $55,008 since 1991 and the commission recommended increasing
them to $95,000 in 1998, to $100,000 in 2000 and $105,000 in 2002. On 17 May 2000, the Crown
rejected the recommendation on salary, modified the recommendations on annual increases and
accepted the balance of the recommendations. The reasons for rejecting the recommendations were that
the proposed increases, ranging from 73 percent to 173 percent depending on the classification of
justices of the peace, were excessive when compared to increases in other funded programs. The
government also argued that the commission had erred on crucial elements. While the trial judge
accepted that the commission had erred in some respects, the justification offered by the government
for rejecting the commission's recommendations was found not to meet the "simply rational" standard
and were declared invalid. See Bodner v. Alberta (2001), 296 A.R. 22 (Q.B).
Bodner, supra note 76 at para. 130.
Supra note 76.
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satisfying an 'an exceptional circumstances' test has, in my respectful view, no foundation
in law.""2 Justice Robertson also disagreed with the majority view in the Alberta Court of
Appeal that the "simply rational" standard required a "thorough and searching examination
of the reasons proffered" and that this standard "is not easy to achieve."83 In his view, the
Alberta Court of Appeal in Bodner had deferred to the judicial compensation commission
rather than to the government, as Lamer C.J.C. had intended in the Re ProvincialCourt
Judges.
In addition to Alberta and New Brunswick, Ontario, " Manitoba85 and Quebec86 have also
witnessed significant litigation between judicial associations and provincial governments
over the "simply rational" standard. A consensus on how courts should approach the delicate
relationship between the demands of judicial associations, the policy preferences of
provincial governments and the expertise of compensation commissions has yet to emerge.
Even where the consensus appeared settled, as in the case of Ontario's commission's
recommendations on salary, which are by statute binding, litigation has emerged in the face
of salary awards perceived as out of line with fiscal reality. 7
Moreover, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the reviewing courts themselves to
remain above the fray. This is illustrated by the aftermath of Bodner. Following the Alberta
Court of Appeal's decision, which resulted in an order that the Alberta Government pay to
the Justices of the Peace benefits totaling $3.2 million, the Government brought a motion to
the Court for a stay of the order pending its appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The
Government indicated in its submissions that if it were forced to pay the monies ordered by
the Court of Appeal immediately, those funds would have to be taken out of the court
services budget (which funds, among other items, the courthouse facilities and resources used
by superior and appellate judges in Alberta). Justice Paperny draws from the Government's
position the following conclusion:
Injustifying the first proposition [that the government must satisfy the commission's recommended salary
increase from the court services budget], the government affidavit states that Justice isgoing through a period
of economic restraint. Why this is so is unclear. As discussed above, the government offers no evidence why
the judgment cannot be paid from general government reserves.... In the absence of a legitimate rationale for
this position, a reasonable person might conclude that its purpose or effect was to apply pressure to the
decision maker, in turn, casting doubt on its impartiality.... The public perception ofjudicial independence

isof utmost importance. Confidence inourjudicial system isfundamental to democracy. If acourt isperceived
to be subject to financial sanction for the decisions it makes, public confidence will,
justifiably, be diminished.
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Ibid. at para. 119.
Ibid. at para. 115.

Ontario Judges'Assn, supra note 76.
Manitoba Provincial Judges'Assn., supra note 76.

Conference desjuges du Qudbec, supra note 76. See also Confirences desjuges du Quebec c. Quebec
(P.G.), [2003] R.J.Q. 1488 (C.S.); Minc c. Qudbec (P.G.), [20031 R.J.Q. 1510 (C.S.), in which the
Quebec Court of Appeal's approach has been applied and extended.

Ontario Conference ofJudges v. Ontario (Management Board) (2004), 188 O.A.C. 244 (Sup. Ct. J.)

(government's argument onjurisdictional grounds based on commission's failure to consider Ontario's
deficit position was rejected on procedural grounds as government had not exhausted its remedies,
government chose not to appeal the decision).
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Where the court is faced with the loss of services to it,
if it fails to grant the order requested, it is reasonable
is adversely affected.88
impartiality
institutional
in
trust
public
that
conclude
to

Consequently, Paperny J.A. concluded that she had to recuse herself from deciding on the
question of the stay and left this for the Supreme Court to consider as well when it hears the
appeal in Bodner.
While it may be accurate to say that the compensation commission's recommendations are
not "binding," it is equally accurate to say that they are not merely "advisory" either. The
search for the reasonableness of a government's departure from commission
recommendations requires scrutiny of the reasons offered by that government and the
connection between those reasons and the facts and evidence on the record. This strikes me
as fundamentally distinct from the review of legislation under the division of powers, where
governments are neither required nor expected to provide "reasons" for their legislative acts.
As framed in Bodner, the New Brunswick ProvincialJudges'Associationcase and others,
the issue appears to be whether courts hearing disputes arising from the rejection of
commission recommendations, by applying the "simply rational" standard, should defer to
the provincial government or defer to the commission. This dichotomous approach tojudicial
independence, in my view, has shown itself wanting. The real problem, I would suggest, is
that, save for exceptional circumstances, courts should not be hearing these disputes to begin
with.
While the appearance of a conflict may not be as apparent where federally appointed
courts are hearing disputes involving provincially appointedjudges, this is a thin distinction,
especially since provincial governments do not divide their court administration budget into
federally appointed and provincially appointed court categories. The spectre of the federal
government's rejection of a salary recommendation for federally appointed judges being
taken to federal court was raised when the government recently balked at a rumoured 10
percent salary increase recommendation to which MP salaries were linked. 9 In the end, the
government chose to detach MP salaries from the judicial remuneration commission's
recommendations and a crisis appears to have been averted. Once again, however, the
absence of a mechanism to effectively depoliticize disputes between courts and governments
isapparent.

B.

CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION THROUGH INTERDEPENDENCE

In light of the judicial remuneration litigation, and the uncertainty and animosity to which
it has given rise, one approach in the area of court rules would be simply to take a clear
stance on the final authority of one branch of government. Deschnes, in his report,
recommended that "in the area of rules of practice and procedure, all common law
jurisdictions should recognize and confer on the judiciary complete authority, without

Bodner v. Alberta (2003), 327 A.R. 77 at paras. 27, 29 (C.A.).
Jeremy Hainsworth "Judges Act headache for PM; Judges await decision on pay increase, but conflict
of interest may arise as increase linked to MPs' pay" The Hamilton Spectator (12 July 2004) A 10.
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executive control or veto"9 and also that legislative provisions conferring on the Lieutenant
Governor in Council the exclusive authority to enact rules of practice and procedure should
be repealed. While Deschnes adopted a fairly narrow definition of these rules (and
distinguished them from the more general rules of civil procedure, although he thought
judicial control over these rules should be given "serious consideration" as well), 9' this
recommendation reflected his overarching belief that at the end of the day the administration
of the courts should be a matter reserved for the courts. While I tend to agree with this view
of the constitutional authority, this does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that decisionmaking over rules, broadly construed, should reside alone with courts to be exercised in
isolation from government priorities and preferences.
When one broadens the horizon of court rules to include fees, simplified procedures,
mediation, case management and administrative matters that bear directly on the courtroom
(as the principles of judicial independence and access to justice suggest we should), the
simple approach ofjudges being "masters in their own house" looks more problematic. It is
in these broader areas that courts and governments may most often be divided. Each has tools
at its disposal to pursue its vision of court rules. In Ontario, for example, the government
introduced mandatory mediation and case management (notwithstanding resistence from the
Bar) in order to achieve its policy goals of encouraging settlements and reducing the cost and
delay associated with lengthy litigation. In November 2004, the Toronto Region of the
Ontario Superior Court issued a Practice Direction that significantly curtailed the application
of mandatory mediation and case management in Toronto to achieve its policy goal of
redressing the civil case backlog and rising cost of litigation in Toronto.92
The approach I advocate, thought hardly a solution to all the vexing concerns to which
court rules may give rise, is to conceive of court rules along a spectrum - on one end, there
are a series of settings where the government may (and should) have ultimate authority to
develop and apply certain rules, but where in practice the government's ability to achieve its
objectives will depend on meaningful consultation with courts. An example of such an area
might be court fees or decisions relating to the design and configuration of courthouses whether a courtroom could be used for a sentencing circle or accommodate video
conferencing affects both court rules and governmental resources. On the other end of the
spectrum are settings where the judiciary has the final say but where the courts' ability to
achieve its objectives may depend on meaningful consultation with the government,
especially where resources are involved. An example ofthis might be organizing the schedule
of circuit courts. In the middle of the spectrum is an important and underscrutinized grey
zone, where for constitutional and pragmatic reasons, neither side can or should be permitted
to trump the other - and where courts and governments are compelled through their mutual

Deschdnes Report, supra note 15 at 132. The focus on common law jurisdictions was in recognition of
the different legislative scheme dealing with court rules in Quebec, which recognized the autonomy of
the courts in relation to rule-making.
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interest in the administration of justice to work together to resolve differences, find
compromises and overcome barriers. An example of this might be the decision to adopt
court-annexed mediation. All of these areas should be seen as sites of interdependence.
Interdependence presupposes a measure of autonomy but also a shared reliance.
A framework of interdependence should not exclude the involvement of other key
participants in the justice system. While the ConstitutionAct, 1867 is silent on the rights of
stakeholders to have input into justice system policy, the success of court rules often depends
on the perspective of downstream users. Where collaboration is itself constitutionally
mandated, or where it is simply desirable, it may be beneficial to include outside groups in
the rule-making process. As Lord Woolfobserved in his report to the Lord Chancellor on the
development of new court rules for the United Kingdom, the inclusion of "consumer" and
"lay" advisory input provided a crucial "counterbalance" to the professional legal viewpoint
that often dominates rules committees." 3 Lord Woolfalso saw the development of court rules
as a reflection of a culture of access to justice - he asserted, "Genuine access to justice
requires people to be able to understand how the legal procedure works. The procedure,
working properly, is a vital guarantee that justice will be done; that it can be seen to work
properly helps to ensure that justice will be seen to be done." 94 The importance of public
confidence in the justice system animates and underlies the imperative that governments and
courts treat the rules of court as a joint enterprise.
An interesting example of this collaborative approach was the experience of Ontario with
a major overhaul of its rules of civil procedure in the early 1980s. 95 Now Chief Justice, then
Attorney General Roy McMurtry struck a task force in the mid 1970s to review revisions to
the court rules, with a clear mandate to simplify the rules, consider alternative, more
expeditious and less formal adjudicative procedures and to determine an appropriate method
for the continuous review of the rules in the future. In short, the government staked out a
policy interest in court reform. The rules committee thereafter considered this initiative and
gave its enthusiastic endorsement, assisted by a committee ofjudges from the then Supreme
and County Courts. A broader committee of leading members of the Bar also gave its
imprimatur to the initiative and respected academics were retained to provide opinions. A
comparative study of other jurisdictions was undertaken. A variety of organizations, both
within and outside the legal profession were consulted and invited to make submissions.
Draft rules were circulated for comment before advisory committees, who met 31 times
during the drafting ofthe rules. Court staffand registrars were engaged in lengthy discussions
to ascertain their perspectives. While this was not a perfect process, it was a largely
successful one, which managed to pay fidelity tojudicial independence as well as ministerial
responsibility, access to justice as well as Parliamentary sovereignty.
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Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in
England and Wales (London: HMSO, 1996).
Ibid. at 272.
An account of this process is contained in correspondence between the Chair of the Civil Procedure
Revision Committee, Walter Williston to Attorney General Roy McMutry (4 February 1980), reprinted
in Walter Williston, Civil Procedure Revision Committee (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General,
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The constitutional imperative of collaboration may lead to a variety of institutional forms.
The litmus test is whether both governments and courts have confidence in the process. This
is, I believe, where thejudicial remuneration process has become unduly rigid and where the
rules development process has remained flexible. Nonetheless, flexibility cannot be a
substitute for constitutional principle. What I suggest here is that the existence of an
independent commission of the courts, or some analogous non-judicial, non-governmental
body to which disputes between government and courts can be brought (and perhaps even
references to clarify constitutional boundaries), would go a long way to allaying the tensions
that now animate disputes over some court fees and rules innovations. Such a body would
be able to mediate and communicate the shared guardianship of the courts and government
over, among other principles, access tojustice. At the end of the day, the justice system rises
or falls not simply on the diffuse notion of public confidence in the administration ofjustice
or respect for the rule of law but rather on the lived experience of litigants, judges, lawyers
and court staff. The integrity and aspiration ofourjustice system is contained in its rules and
practices; the constitutional principles discussed above make collaborative approaches to
those rules and practices both possible and necessary.

